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ARTICLES

OF GOD AND CAESAR: THE FREE
EXERCISE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
SCHOOL STUDENTS
George W. Dent, Jr.*

Then saith [Jesus] unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar
the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that
are God's.'
When the Pharisees tried to "entangle" Jesus by asking "Is it
lawful to give tribute unto Caesar, or not," He avoided the trap by
distinguishing the sacred from the secular. 2 When Caesar imposes
on children an education that offends their belief in God, however,
it may be impossible to satisfy both injunctions. Many religious
people today feel that government is hostile to their religion, especially in the public schools. They seek relief from classes that
offend their faith so that they can "[r]ender ... unto God the
things that are God's" without disobeying Caesar. Schools often
grant these requests voluntarily. When there is litigation, the results
are mixed, but parents win often enough to suggest that there are
some free exercise rights in these situations.
I will briefly describe these controversies and then analyze the
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on these issues and sug-

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1. Matthew: 22:21.
2. /d. at 22:15-22.
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gest how they should be resolved.

I.

BACKGROUND: TYPICAL RELIGIOUS COMPLAINTS ABOUT
SCHOOL INSTRUCTION

Most religious objections to public education come from religious traditionalists-primarily fundamentalist Protestants, but also
traditional Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and smaller sects. The objections vary. 3 Some would seem strange, even incomprehensible to
most Americans, but others are intelligible and more appealing to
the mainstream. One study of several widely used textbooks4
found that "[p]atriotism is close to nonexistent"5 and the role of
business in American life is "ignored. " 6 Traditional family values
and sex roles are slighted: The family is defined as just "a group
of people,"7 marriage is ignored,8 and divorce is pronounced acceptable or "a neutral event. " 9 The one-parent family is
condoned. 10 Women are never portrayed as homemakers, and
motherhood and marriage are rarely depicted positively-the words
"marriage," "wedding," "husband" and "wife" were not mentioned
once in sixty social studies textbooks surveyed. 11
The teaching of ethics also draws protest. Many public schools
preach a moral relativism that rejects any notion of enduring values. 12 Self-actualization is treated as the highest goal. 13 Sex education, including instruction about AIDS, is a fertile source of trouble. Parents have objected to a pamphlet that advised "'use latex

3. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 863, 865-73 (1988).
4. PAUL C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S TEXTBOOKS
(1986).
5. Id. at 75 (conclusion as to textbooks used to teach reading).
6. Id. at 3 (conclusion as to textbooks used to teach reading).
7. ld. at 37 (quoting FREDERICK M. KING ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILIES 6
(1983)).
8. Id. at 38 (discussing the bias found in social studies textbooks).
9. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 1008 (S.D. Ala.) (quoting
CONNIE R. SASSE, PERSON TO PERSON 300 (1981)) (addressing whether textbooks used in
public schools promoted the religion of secular humanism and violated the Establishment
Clause), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (lith Cir. 1987).
10. See FRANCES B. PARNELL, HOMEMAKING SKIIl..S FOR EVERYDAY LIVING 88 (1984)
(saying that the one-parent family is not "inferior").
11. VITZ, supra note 4, at 2.
12. See Fred M. Hechlnger, A Matter of Censorship, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1987, at
Cll (discussing the controversy over secular humanism in the Smith decision).
13. See Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 1000 ("Self-actualization is the highest level of human
need.") (quoting VERDENE RYDER, CONTEMPORARY LIVING 20 (1981)).
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condoms plus spermicide . . . if you can't be sure your partner is
not infected with the [AIDS] virus,' and to 'limit the number of
sexual partners to reduce your chance of exposure to the virus. "' 14
A curriculum guide for New York City public schools comments
on masturbation: "Do it, it's fun." 15
Finally, the historical role of religion is slighted except in its
relation to non-Western societies and among American minorities. 16 Thus "Protestantism is almost entirely excluded, at least for
whites." 17 For example, the religious motives of the Pilgrims have
been extirpated/ 8 and in a story by Isaac Singer, references to
God were deleted. 19
Perhaps in theory it should not matter whether these complaints
are plausible to most Americans-the First Amendment protects
unusual as well as commonplace religious beliefs. In practice, however, it does make a difference, as evidenced by an editorial in the
New York Times that ridiculed certain religious objections as
"know-nothing-alarmism."20 Obviously, one's view of the plausibility of a complaint influences one's views about its legal validity.
Public education is often portrayed as value neutral. 21 Traditional religionists reject the idea of value neutral education-they
want their children educated in the values of their religion. 22

14. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N ..£.2d 420, 423 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting
THE WELLNESS WAY: UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING AIDS).
15. Quoted in Richard Vigilante, Winning in New York, NAT'L REV., Jan. 18, 1993, at
18.
16. VITZ, supra note 4, at 16-18 (finding occasional references to Jewish, Mormon,
and other minority religions and a greater emphasis on religion in other cultures in social
studies textbooks).
17. Jd. at 75 (conclusion as to textbooks used to teach reading). See generally ROBERT
BRYAN, HISTORY, PSEUDO-HiSTORY, ANTI-HISTORY: HoW PuBLIC SCHOOL TExTBOOKS
TREAT RELIGION (1983) (giving examples of the ignoring of, and distorting of, the role of
religion in textbooks); William R. Marty, To Favor Neither Religion Nor Nonreligion:
Schools in a Pluralist Society, in EQUAL SEPARATION 95, 99 (Paul J. Weber ed., 1990)
("[T]he thrust in the public schools is to treat religion not at all, or as irrelevant, or as
superstition.").
18. See VITZ, supra note 4, at 3, 18 (examples in social studies textbooks).
19. Id. at 3-4 (changes made in a sixth grade reader). See also id. at 79 (attempt by
publisher to remove religious references from another story).
20. See Jim and Pat Cook. Jim Cooks First, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 13, 1986, at A26.
21. Rosemary C. Salome, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1992) (asserting that our society has become more
diverse, challenging the "myth" that public education is value neutral).
22. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Crouse, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 234-35 (1989) (asserting that fundamentalists feel threatened by the influence of "secular humanism" in school curriculum).
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More importantly, education can never be value neutral - inevitably, education promotes some values and belittles others. 23 Moreover, ·in many cases public schools make no effort to be neutral or
even-handed; it is in these cases that traditional religionists often
complain. For example, considerable controversy now swirls around
the treatment of homosexuality in the public schools.24 Although
many parents would resist a treatment that gave all points of view,
it is important to note that most disputes have arisen in schools
that do not pursue even-handedness. Many public schools now
portray homosexuality as normal and acceptable. 25 These schools
give children no other side of the issue; they do not mention that
our main religious traditions (not just fundamentalists) regard homosexuality as a sin and an abomination in the eyes of God. 26
Thus, it should be kept in mind that the teaching to which religious traditionalists object is not value neutral and often does not
even try to be so.

II.

THE

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

The law on the free exercise rights of public school students is
jumbled. Students are often accommodated without litigation. Many
state education laws exempt religious objectors from physical education, sex and AIDS education, and other instruction. 27 Absent
statutory exemptions, local school districts, principals, or teachers
may grant them. 28 Sometimes accommodation includes substitute
instruction. 29
23. See id. at 238-39 (1989) (arguing that value-free education is impossible for several
reasons).
24. See Josh Barbanel, Under "Rainbow, " a War: When Politics, Morals and Learning
Mix, N.Y. nMEs, Dec. 27, 1992, at 34 (describing the controversy surrounding the "Children of the Rainbow" curriculum in New York City); Maria E. Odum, Topic of Homosexuality Shows Diversity in Sex Education, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992, at B1 (discussing
the treatment of the topic of homosexuality in sex education classes in area schools).
25. See William Celis, III, Schools Across U.S. Cautiously Adding Lessons on Gay
Life, N.Y. nMEs, Jan. 6, 1993, at A7.
26. See Sam Roberts, Politics and the Curriculum Fight, N.Y. nMEs, Dec. 15, 1992,
at B1 (defending the different objections to the Rainbow Curriculum in New York City).
27. See Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dis!., 550 N.E.2d 420, 422-23 (N.Y. 1989)
(describing New York laws on religious exemptions in public schools); MARTHA M. McCARTHY, A DEUCATE BALANCE: CffiJRCH, STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 59-60 (1983) (describing statutory religious exemptions from sex education classes).
28. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at 60 (noting that litigation can arise when school officials do not grant an exception not provided for by statute or administrative regulation).
Furthermore, requests for excused absences based on religious reasons are also most often
handled by the school and do not require litigation. !d. at 69.
29. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073-74 (6th Cir.
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When accommodation is denied, some parents sue. Reported
opinions in these cases are few and the results are inconsistent.
Parents usually (though not always) win an exemption from offensive instruction, but rarely gain any further relier_3°
ill.

FREE EXERCISE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

After Wisconsin v. Yoder, 31 the standard for free exercise
claims seemed clear:. government act that substantially infringes a
sincerely held religious belief is unconstitutional unless justified by
a compelling state interest pursued by the least restrictive means. 3 ~
Unfortunately, that standard was called into question by Em-

a

1987) (suit ensued when school stopped giVIng children alternative texts), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.) (school
excused child from a class using religiously offensive book and assigned child an alternative book), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
30. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (A.rnish children granted exemption
from attending school past eighth grade); Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972)
(exemption granted from participation in ROTC); Church of God v. Amarillo Indep. Sch.
Dist., 511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (school policy limiting absences for religious
holidays violated free exercise), aff'd, 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1982); Moody v. Cronin, 484
F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (exemption granted from coeducational physical education
classes); Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211-12 & n.7 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) (child excused from classes on evolution; the state educational code provided
exemption for students from classes where subject matter conflicts with religious beliefs),
aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). Cf
Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.) (further relief denied where
school excused child from class using religiously offensive book and assigned child an
alternative book), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n,
683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (case remanded for determination of whether plaintiffs'
religious obligation to wear yarmulkes could be accommodated while still meeting safety
concerns underlying rule against basketball players wearing headgear that might fall off),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 406 (D.N.H. 1974)
(child exempted from audio-visual programs intended for entertainment, but not those
intended for education, and not from health education program); Ware v. Valley Stream
High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989) (suit remanded for determination of burden
on plaintiffs' religious exercise and whether state had compelling interest in requiring
AIDS education). But see Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th
Cir. 1987) (all relief denied), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Keller v. Gardner Community Consol. Grade Sch. Dist., 552 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (school athlete denied
exemption for missing practice to take Catholic catechism which he could have taken on
another day).
31. 406 u.s. 205 (1972).
32. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (holding that contributions for church training courses are not deductible as charitable contributions under §
170 of the Internal Revenue Code); JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106869 (3d ed. 1986) (stating the balancing test used by the Court to determine whether an
exemption can be granted from a law burdening a religious practice).
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ployment Division v. Smith, 33 where the Supreme Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt religious use of peyote by
American Indians from a state antidrug law. 34 More importantly,
without warning, and without the parties' having raised or argued
the issue, Employment Division v. Smith announced a new standard
of free exercise jurisprudence that distinguishes between belief and
conduct:
[T]he First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such." The government
may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, im:..
pose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or
religious status, or lend its power to one or the other side
in controversies over religious authority or dogma. 35
[But] the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 36
Most commentators treated this statement as the death knell of
free exercise. 37 They reasoned that government rarely controls expression of religious belief; 38 laws limiting religious freedom almost always regulate conduct, which Employment Division v. Smith
permits. 39 Thus, even such venerable practices as the use of wine
in the Eucharist or the Passover seder could be forbidden so long

33. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
34. !d. at 890.
35. Id at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
36. !d. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
37. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743, 755-59 (1992). Lupu refers to Employme/lt Division v. Smith as having "closed the
modern era of free exercise adjudication." Id at 757. See also Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. ll09, ll44-45
(1990) (criticizing the Employment Division v. Smith decision for "eliminating the doctrine
of free exercise exemptions 'instead or contributing to the development of a more principled approach").
38. McConnell, supra note 37, at ll45 (asserting that the history of permissible government intervention into religious exercise extends only to instances needed to protect the
public or children).
39. Employme/lt Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 ("We have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.").
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as the prohibition were general. 40
Although the standard announced in Employment Division v.
Smith is distressing, it does not necessarily doom free exercise
claims by public school students. First, although attendance and
participation in school are conduct, they involve belief in ways that
most activities do not. The most common religious objection to
public schooling is that it subjects students to indoctrination hostile
to their faith. 41 In some situations students are even compelled or
forbidden to express beliefs. Such a situation occurs when students
who believe the Biblical account of creation are required to treat
evolution as true. 42 In this type of case government directly "compel[s] affirmation" or "punish[es] the expression of religious doctrines," which Employment Division v. Smith forbids. 43
Usually indoctrination is less blunt. For instance, a more subtle indoctrination occurs where stories or discussions portray homosexuality or illegitimacy as normal and acceptable. This could be
forbidden by Employment Division v. Smith as "lend[ing
government's] power to one or the other side in controversies over
religious authority or dogma." 44 Moreover, the impact of government indoctrination is likely to be greater when its objects are
impressionable children. 45 Thus school instruction could also be

40. Michael McConnell lists several commonly accepted activities that might be forbidden if Employment Division v. Smith were so construed. McConnell, supra note 37, at
1142-43 (examples include requiring the Catholic Church to hire female priests, no longer
requiring prisons to observe dietary laws of Jewish or Muslim inmates, and desegregating
the sexes at Orthodox Jewish services).
41. See Ingber, supra note 22, at 235-37. Ingber discusses Mozer! v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Smith
v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1987); and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), and concludes that "'the recurring
underlying theme was the fear held by some that public education might influence or
even "indoctrinate' children in directions contrary to fundamental religious perspectives."'
Ingber, supra note 22, at 237.
42. The Louisiana statute that required equal treatment for creationism if evolution
were taught in a public school, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593, was triggered by such an event. A legislator's son recited in
school that "'God created the World, and God created man." The teacher graded this answer "'unsatisfactory." See Alan Freeman & Betty Mensch, Religion as SciencejScience as
Religion: Constitutional Law and the Fundamentalist Challenge, 2 TIKKUN 64, 64-65
(1987).
43. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
44. /d.
45. The Weisman Court also makes this distinction between children and adults as to
the impact of government indoctrination. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992)
(noting that a particular danger of coercion exists with prayer at public schools). The
Court further makes this point by differentiating prayer at a graduation ceremony from the
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deemed "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such. " 46
On these grounds alone, Employment Division v. Smith might validate some free exercise claims of public school children.
Second, Employment Division v. Smith states that the First
Amendment sometimes
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action [that] involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as . . .
the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters . . . to direct the education of their children, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder ....47
The specific citation of public school cases shows that Employ.... ment Division v. "smith does not preclude free exercise claims by
students.~ Pierce recognized a constitutional right to send one's children to private rather than public schools. 48 Yoder upheld a right
of parents to remove their children from school altogether after the
eighth grade. 49 However, that decision applied only to the Amish
sect which, the Court carefully noted, provides its children effective
vocational training. 50 Moreover, Yoder and Pierce permit parents
only to remove children from public schools completely. 51
Total removal may be less problematic than withdrawing children from particular classes or demanding alternative instruction, as

situation in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 782 (1983), where prayer beginning a
state legislative session was held not to violate the Establishment Clause because adults
were involved. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61. See also Developments in the Law Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1659-60 (1987) (asserting that a "paramount concern" of the Court in Establishment Clause violations in the public school setting "is the particular vulnerability of school children to indoctrination and coercion").
46. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 402 (1963)).
47. /d. at 872, 881 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944). In Prince, the Court stated, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . ." /d. However, the Court upheld a
statute forbidding children to sell goods on public streets against the parents' claim that
their faith required the children to sell religious tracts. !d. at 170.
48. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that an Oregon statute requiring that a child
be sent to public school interferes with the parents' and guardians' right to choose the
child's education).
49. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
50. !d. at 228-29, 234-36.
51. /d. at 234; Pierce, 268 .U.S. at 234-35.
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some parents have done. 52 Thus Employment Division v. Smith's
reference to a "right to direct the education of [one's] children" 53
is cryptic. It may be no more than a shorthand for the rights recognized in Pierce and Yoder; or it may presage broader parents'
rights, partly under the Free Exercise Clause.
The more recent decision in Lee v. Weisman 54 construes the
Establishment Clause, but it may also be important to free exercise
issues. The majority framed the issue there as whether a prayer at
a public school graduation subjects citizens to compulsion. 55 Although a compulsion test might suggest a narrow definition for the
Establishment Clause, the majority concluded that the prayer did
exert compulsion because graduates and their families are pressured
to attend the ceremony and to participate to some extent in the
prayer. 56
Weisman's result is commendable but its reasoning is dubious.
It strains the idea of compulsion to say that children and parents
are compelled to attend commencement at all, and strains it further
to say that they are compelled to participate in the prayer merely
by observing the respectful silence that minimal courtesy demands.
The Court would have done better to forbid the prayer because it
endorsed religion. 57 Nonetheless, the broad definition of compulsion is significant, especially because the context is a public school
graduation. Attendance at graduation is not legally mandated; attendance at regular classes is. Participation in the prayer was not
required; participation in many other aspects of public schooling is.
It should follow, then, that virtually all activity in public schools
involves compulsion. 58

52. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
53. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
54. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
55. Id. at 2652.
56. /d. at 2658-59.
57. Support for a "no endorsement" test has been advanced by Justice O'Connor. For
a discussion of this test, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,
270-74 (1987) (criticizing the "no endorsement" test as defective and unable to provide
consistency and clarity to establishment clause doctrine). As recently as Smith the Court
stated that "[t]he government may not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in
controversies over religious authority or dogma." Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
58. The Court referred to graduation as· "the one school event most important for the
student to attend," Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660, and "one of life's most significant occasions." ld. at 2559. Presumably this hyperbole has little or no legal relevance. It is doubtful, for example, that the Court would permit similar prayers during daily assemblies on
the grounds that such assemblies are less "important" or "significant" than graduation.
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When is compulsion unconstitutional? Weisman says: "The
design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of
religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere . . . . [The Religion] Clauses exist to
protect religion from government interference. " 59 Although this
passage preserves the belief/conduct dichotomy laid down in Employment Division v. Smith, 60 it suggests an expansive definition
of the scope of belief: not only belief itself, but the "preservation
and transmission" of beliefs are protected, and the regulation of
belief that is prohibited encompasses any "government interference. " 61 Although instruction inconsistent with a child's faith may
not directly regulate belief, it does seem to interfere with the preservation and transmission of belief and thus appears to be forbidden.
Employment Division v. Smith is arguably distinguishable from
the public school cases because this case involved the use of hallucinogens.62 American law has long frowned on the use of these
drugs, and public concern about drug abuse was especially intense
when Employment Division v. Smith was decided. Christian and
Jewish rituals eschew narcotics, 63 so the narrow holding of that
case does not threaten our major religions. By contrast, many large
sects object to certain practices of the public schools. It is regrettable that the Court was not more sympathetic to the minority religious practices at issue in Employment Division v. Smith, but that
insensitivity will not necessarily extend to the claims of more traditional sects. 64
The significance of the public school setting is highlighted by
comparing Marsh v. Chambers, 65 which involved prayer in state

59. /d. at 2656-57.

60. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-57.
62. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (ingesting peyote at a Native American Church ceremony).
63. The use of wine in Christian and Jewish rl'tuals is too minimal to have a narcotic
effect. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1003 (1990) (describing the amount of wine consumed
during a Catholic ceremony as a "tiny nip'').
64. Cf McConnell, supra note 37, at 1135 (noting that any distinction made between
wine used in a sacrament and peyote used in a Native American ceremony is "not based
on any objective differences between the effects of the two substances" but instead is
based on familiarity and prejudice).
65. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that prayer opening state legislative sessions does not
violate the Establishment Clause).
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legislative sessions, with Weisman. Weisman dwells upon "protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elemel\tary and secondary public schools. " 66 By contrast, the
Marsh Court deemed the pressures on adults to participate in a
legislature's prayers to be much weaker. 67
This distinction helps refute the common argument68 that
"mere exposure" to ideas hostile to one's religion does not violate
free exercise. Weisman distinguishes .between free speech claims
and religion clause claims. The theory of the former is that debate
should be open and robust. Although government's discretion to
take sides is limited even in nonreligious debates, it can and often
must take sides in these disputes. 69 However:
The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom
of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In
religious debate or expression the government is not a
prime participant . . . . [T]he Establishment Clause is a
specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech
provisions. 70
Although the Court never states that mere exposure to government speech that offends one's religion is invariably unconstitution-

66. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
67. The Weisman Court stated:
The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature where adults
are free to enter and leave with little conunent and for any number of reasons
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school event most
important for the student to attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise in a school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh.
!d. at 2660.
68. See Mozer! v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that requiring students to use the school's reader series does not violate the
Establishment Clause), cert. detzied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Nadine Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism": Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular
Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 374-75 (1986)
(proposing a standard to provide more protection for religious beliefs of public school
students).
69. Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (government may favor childbirth over abortion) and Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550-51
(1983) (government may subsidize some lobbying organizations and not others) and
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (government may fund some candidates for
public office and not others) with Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 234 (1987) (invalidating tax that discriminated between magazines on the basis of
their content because it violated freedom of the press).
70. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2657-58.
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al, the Court recognizes that the coercive atmosphere of public
schools makes "exposure" especially dangerous there. 71 Also, the
Court has held, in Yoder and in Pierce, that compelled exposure to
religiously offensive teaching can violate the Constitution. 72
Weisman does not decide whether the option of protesting neutralizes the offense "if the affected citizens are mature adults, but we
think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause,
place primary and secondary school children in this position."73
This discussion illustrates a second problem that arises when
students are subjected to doctrine that is offensive to their religion:
not only may it improperly influence their beliefs, but their very
presence and respectful silence may be taken as assent to that
doctrine. This problem feeds on itself. The endorsement of an idea
by the teacher-a government official and an authority figure-may
torment a student to whom the idea is religiously offensive. If her
peers fail to protest, she assumes that they agree with the teacher,
which makes the student feel like even more of a misfit or pariah.
Given students' reluctance to dissent, 74 this silent torment could
arise even if most students in fact disagree with the teacher.
Although Weisman deals with the Establishment Clause, "mere
exposure" should be treated similarly under the Free Exercise
Clause. The statement in Weisman that religion is "committed to
the private sphere,"75 free from "government interference,"76 applies equally to government actions that denigrate some sect, or
religion generally, as well as to government actions that endorse
religion. Indeed, the offense in free exercise cases is often worse
than the offense in Weisman. In Weisman, the plaintiffs were mere-

71. The Weisma11 Court suggested that a graduation ceremony atmosphere:
places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to . . . ,
at least, maintain respectful silence . . . . This pressure, though subtle and
indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. Of course, in our culture
standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view . . . . [G]iven our
social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the
group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.
!d. at 2658.
72. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
u.s. 510, 535 (1925).
73. Weisma11, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
74. This reluctance was recognized in Weisma11. There, the Court stated that it was an
"unacceptable constraint" in violation of the Establishment Clause to impose a choice of
whether or not to dissent upon children, who are assumably susceptible to peer pressure
"in matters of social convention." !d. at 2659.
75. !d. at 2656.
76. !d.

1993]

REUGJON AND THE PUBUC SCHOOLS

719

ly expected to maintain respectful silence during the offensive
prayer. 77 In cases like Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,78 though, children are expected to pay attention to and absorb teaching that offends their religion. One can justify a greater
sensitivity to establishment claims than to free exercise claims only
if the religion clauses are viewed as promoting secularism.
Weisman, however, confirms the Supreme Court's frequent assertion that the religion clauses demand governmental neutrality not
only among different religions, but also between religion and secularism.79 The goal of neutrality dictates equal sensitivity to both
types of claims. 80
77. /d. at 2653.
78. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d !058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987),
cer(. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
79. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-57 and supra text accompanying note 71; County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 588 (1989) (indicating that the Establishment
Clause "prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief'); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (invoking the constitutional principles emphasizing that government shall not "promote or hinder a particular faith or faith
generally"); Grand Rapids Sch. Dis!. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (slating that the
government is required "to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between
religion and non-religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (stating that "the
government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion"); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1976) ("Neutrality is what is required");
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (positing that the central purpose of
the Establishment Clause is to "[ensure] governmental neutrality in matters of religion");
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (stating that "[!]he general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that
we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference
with religion"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (stating that the "First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion"); Abington Sch. Dis!. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)
(indicating that the government's position of neutrality means that it may neither support
the tenets of any or all religions, nor exhibit hostility to religion in general); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (supporting "an attitude on the part of government
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I,
18 (1947) (emphasizing that the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"). See also Douglas Laycock,
A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 409, 409 (1986)
(indicating a belief that the two religion clauses merit "equal seriousness,"' and therefore,
"that government neutrality towards religion is a good first approximation for the meaning
of the clauses"'). Various versions of the Religion Clauses were rejected by the framers to
assuage the fears that the proposed amendments might disfavor religion generally or even
favor atheism. See CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FiRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
137-38 (1964) (indicating that the first Congress considered multiple versions of the Religion Clauses); Laycock, supra, at 412-13 (quoting individuals among the framers who
feared that the clauses would abolish religion or favor atheists).
80. It is no answer that free exercise claims are different from Establishment Clause
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Applying Weisman, an Establishment Clause case, to free exercise issues is somewhat controversial 81 since the religion clauses
of the First Amendment are often treated as embracing separate,
even contradictory principles. The distinction made is that the Free
Exercise Clause confers benefits on religion, while the Establishment Clause imposes burdens on religion. This, however, is a false
dichotomy - the principles protected by the two clauses are not
antipodal, but are remarkably similar. Establishments of religion are
offensive because they force people to submit to or subsidize a
faith they do not espouse, or to suffer the indignity of seeing their
government endorse such a faith. To the irreligious, however, the
injury caused by religion is no worse than injury caused by governmental adoption of a nonreligious doctrine that they reject.
Establishments of particular religions, as opposed to nonreligious
doctrines, are therefore distinctly repugnant primarily to those who
espouse other religions. 82 Religion cannot be singled out as divi-

claims because offense to one's religion cannot be avoided without gutting education,
while endorsement of religion can always be avoided. Perceptions of government endorsement of religion can never be fully avoided. In a society like ours, religion is a ubiquitous and integral part of life. V!TZ, supra note 4, at 80 ("religion, especially Christianity,
has played and continues to play a central role in American life"). Thus, a good education will frequently deal with religion in ways that some might interpret as endorsements.
A positive treatment of the Reverend Martin Luther King, for example, might be seen by
some as endorsing his religious views. Many public schools have tried to eliminate all
references to religion. For example, one social studies book instructed children that at the
First Thanksgiving the Pilgrims gave thanks to the Indians. See id. at 3. Not only are
these pathetic efforts doomed to failure, but the goal of avoiding all references to religion
is undesirable since it inevitably distorts students' understanding of our society by ripping
an important part of our cultural heritage from the curriculum. See id. at 80 ("To neglect
to report . . . [religion's role in American life] is simply to fail to carry out the major
duty of any textbook writer-the duty to tell the truth.").
81. See John Garvey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 761, 761 (1993)
(pointing out that issues in Weisman, an Establishment Clause case, and those of various
free exercise cases are doctrinally different). But see infra note 93 and accompanying text.
82. Although believers are most often offended by the establishment of another's religion, many are also offended by the establishment of their own faith. For example, many
Anabaptists believe that an establishment of their own faith would violate their principle
of free will in religious matters. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1991). Professor
Smith argues persuasively that the traditional justifications for religious freedom were
themselves based on religion. /d. at 149. Commentators and the Supreme Court have
eschewed these explanations in favor of secular justifications. /d. at 197 (describing the
most common secular justifications as: the "civic virtue" rationale, the "personal autonomy" rationale, the "pluralism" rationale, the "civic strife" rationale, and the "nonalienation"
rationale). The secular justifications are unsatisfactory, however, and reliance on them will
generate confusion. See id. at 198 (stating that the secular rationales are "probably too
weak and vulnerable to sustain a strong constitutional commitment to religious liberty").
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sive. Although religious conflict has caused much strife, nonreligious disputes have been even more deadly both in this country
and in the rest of the world. 83 The principle function, then, of the
two religion clauses is the same-to eliminate or minimize government offense to citizens' religious beliefs.
Although Weisman holds promise for free exercise claims,
Professor Lupu has argued that the First Amendment discussion in
Rust v. Sullivan 84 points the other way. 85 In Rust, the Supreme
Court held that, while government cannot prohibit abortions, it may
forbid federally funded counseling services to give advice about
abortions. 86 Professor Lupu says: "If the government may impose
benefit conditions that expressly limit protected speech, benefit
conditions that are generally reasonable but unintentionally affect
religion are presumably valid a fortiori." 87
Rust has little relevance to free exercise claims of public
school children. The rule in Rust forbids government agents to
make certain statements that their clients want to hear. 88 A proper
analogy to Rust would be a situation in which a teacher desires to
teach something that the government excludes from the curriculum.
Consistent with Rust, the government may generally dictate a curriculum and expect the teachers to conform with it. 89 Most free

83. See id. at 207-10 (stating that ""religion is only one of a number of sources of
civil strife''). In the World Wars and the American Civil War, religion played a small
role. The mass killings by Communists in the Soviet Union and China and by the National Socialists in Germany were carried out by governments officially committed to
atheism. See id. at 208 n.236 (""'Religious differences in this country have never generated the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the Vietnam
War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery.'"' (quoting Michael W.
McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405, 413)).
84. lll S. Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991).
85. See Lupu, supra note 37, at 752 n.36.
86. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1777 (rejecting petitioners' contention that the regulations prohibiting any discussion of abortion by recipient organizations of federal family planning
funds violated the First Amendment).
87. Lupu, supra note 37, at 752 n.36. Regarding Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), and other Supreme Court cases holding that states may not deny unemployment
benefits to people who leave or refuse jobs for religious reasons, Lupu says that "[o]ne
might therefore expect the entire Sherbert line to disappear sometime soon."" Lupu, supra
note 37, at 752 n.36.
88. See Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1777.
89. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1515 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding
that State authorities could regulate a teacher's classroom conduct, and thus forbid both
the teacher from silently reading the Bible during the students' independent reading period, and direct the teacher to teach students actively during that time), aff'd, 921 F.2d
1047 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992).
Even the evolution cases are not really exceptions. In those cases, the Court forbade
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exercise claims by school children, however, seek not to silence
government agents, but to avoid messages that these agents would
otherwise force them to hear. 90 The state's power to prescribe the
scope of teachers' speech while on the job does not imply a power
to require children to hear that speech.
A further difference is the cost of obtaining private substitutes.
Both the rule in Rust and religiously offensive public schoolh1g
may force citizens to buy substitutes. Yet whereas private abortion
counseling is too expensive only for the poorest of Americans,
private schooling is unattainable fOi most Americans. 91 Thus, the
burden that religiously offensive public education inflicts on free
exercise far exceeds the burden that the rule in Rust imposes on
abortion rights.
In sum, there is good reason to think that the traditional standard of free exercise review prevails, at least for claims by public
school students. Although Employment Division v. Smith raises
fears about the vitality of the Free Exercise Clause, statements in

state legislatures to prohibit by statute the teaching of evolution or to require equal time
for instruction about evolution and creationism. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 596-97 (1987) (holding that a state law requiring either that the theory of evolution
be banished from public schools' curriculum or that it be taught in conjunction with "creation science," violates the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109
( 1968) (holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting instruction on the theory of
evolution). The Court has never ruled, however, that individual teachers have a right to
teach evolution or not to teach creationism. Arguably then, local school boards may still
omit instruction on evolution or treat it equally with creationism.
Courts have occasionally voided the firing of public school teachers whose instruction was unacceptable to school authorities, but the cases are inr.onsistent and the
scope of the teacher's discretion is unclear. See Wll.LIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE § 13.8 (1985) ("[T]he fact remains that the courts have not developed any consensus on the limits of academic freedom."). For a discussion of Rust's impact on claims for substitute instruction, see infra text accompanying notes 184-90.
90. See Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir.) (plaintiffs sued as a
result of the school board's refusal to remove a book that was religiously offensive), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Wright v. Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208,
1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (plaintiffs sought to enjoin instruction on the theory of evolution
which did not include instruction on other human origin theories), aff'd per curiam, 486
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1975).
91. The Court in Rust conceded that the situation might be different if "the doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program [were] sufficiently all-encompassing
so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice." Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991). 1n contrast, public schooling is
about as "all-encompassing" as a government program can be: it occupies more time in
the lives of most citizens than any other government program. Even if a family is able to
pay for ·a religiously inoffensive private education, no school offering such an education
may be locally available.
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both that case as well as in the later decision of Lee v. Weisman
indicate that the Supreme Court has not diluted the standards for
free exercise claims, at least in the context of public schools. Rust
· does not undermine this conclusion. Hopefully the traditional standard will survive. Government should not tell people, especially
young children, that their religion is wrong.
IV.

ELEMENTS OF Tiffi FREE EXERCISE STANDARD

A.

Overview

The Free Exercise Clause should be viewed as embracing two
complementary principles. 92 First, government should be as neutral
as possible about religion in the sense of neither promoting nor
hindering any particular religion or religion in general. 93 Second,
government should aim to maximize religious freedom. The Supreme Court seems to embrace this principle in Weisman when it
says that religion is "committed to the private sphere" and should
be "free from governmental interference. " 94

92. Acceptance of this view has grown among scholars. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon
& Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 541 (1991) ("If the

two religion provisions are read together in the light of an overarching purpose to protect
freedom of religion, most of the tension between them disappears.").
93. Thus I largely embrace the definition of substantive neutrality offered by Douglas
Laycock. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 1001-02 (elaborating upon his basic formulation
of substantive neutrality, which is the constitutional requirement that government "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief,
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance"). The Supreme Court has frequently
stated that the Religion Clauses require governmental neutrality toward religion. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
Neutrality has been attacked as "inherently indeterminate." Smith, supra note 57, at
315. See also John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITI. L. REv. 83, 94-104 (1986) (discussing and illustrating the complexity
and ambiguity of neutrality, a concept having two components: noninvolvement and impartiality). While no concept of neutrality can generate basic, substantive norms, more modest
conceptions of neutrality are possible. See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional
Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 50 (1992) (providing illustrations of less ambitious goals of neutrality). By defining neutrality as neither promoting nor hindering religion, one admittedly accepts, to some
extent, a non-neutral status quo in the sense that some religious groups are more influential than others in American society. Under Sunstein's approach, if the existing distribution
of religious influence is not unjust, there should be no objection to a neutrality in which
government neither alters nor affmnatively maintains the status quo, but instead leaves the
distribution to be determined by non-governmental forces. See id. at 52.
94. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656-57 (1992). In making such an assertion,
the Supreme Court seems to have adopted the position of Michael McConnell: "The prin- ·
cipal purpose of the Religion Clauses is to ensure that decisions about religious practice,
including education, are reserved to the private reahn of individual conscience." Michael
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Neutrality is not mathematically determinable, but a term of
art. For instance, a public museum that exhibits religious works
of art gives unequal treatment to religions like Islam that forbid art
with religious content. 96 This form of inequality is inevitable.
Consider, for example, if publicly subsidized museums excluded
works solely because of their religious content. That kind of
separationism would unnecessarily hinder religion. Such a position
cannot be squared with the principle of religious freedom. The
Supreme Court, however; has not always pursued this principle:
"Separationism and antimajoritarianism, rather than religious freedom, became central to the Warren Court's approach in Religion
Clause cases. " 97
One problem in defining neutrality is to determine the context
in which to analyze government acts and the baseline from which
neutrality must be maintained. 98 For example, accommodation of
95

W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does
Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123, 145. See also
Laycock, supra note 64, at 1002 ("What happens to religion is up to the people acting
severally and voluntarily; it is not up to the people acting collectively through government.").
95. A neutrality standard still "requires judgments about the relative significance of
various encouragements and discouragements to religion." Laycock, supra note 63, at
1004. Thus, it is a valid criticism that a neutrality standard does not automatically resolve
all Religion Clause questions. See Smith, supra note 57, at 313-16 (discussing the absence
of any coherent, clear neutrality doctrine and the inherently indeterminable nature of the
concept of neutrality itself); Valauri, supra note 93, at 85 ("Because of the equivocal
nature of neutrality, its adoption and use mask, even exacerbate, doctrinal disagreement
and conflict.").
96. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 1003 (illustrating that total neutrality is not always
possible since "a standard of minimizing both encouragement and discouragement (often
means] that religion (is] singled out for special treatment").
97. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 493 (discussing the need for the Court to
take a structural approach in its interpretation of the Religion Clauses in order to develop
a "workable, coherent, church-state jurisprudence" in the pluralistic American society).
98. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 1005 (explaining that the neutrality standard requires the determination of a proper baseline from which encouragement and discouragement are to be measured). If care is not taken, the status quo can be unthinkingly used
as the baseline. Then, maintenance of the status quo is deemed neutral and any departure
from it is non-neutral. For example, the Supreme Court has often treated government
funding of secular public schools as a religiously neutral baseline and has held that any
state aid to parochial school children constitutes a non-neutral subsidy of religion that violated the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985)
("Even where state aid to parochial institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Establishment
Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church and state in the administration of
that aid."). This status quo is hardly neutral, however, because it confers an expensive
benefit on those who attend public (secular) schools, while denying that be~efit to those
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religious children in public schools is often opposed as an advancement of religion. 99 This argument makes sense only if the instruction from which accommodation is sought is religiously neutral.
Often, however, it is not. In fact, instruction often disparages
children's religious beliefs even if there is no intent to disparage. 100 In such circumstances, accommodation is neutral if it
merely seeks to free the children from such disparagement and,
from a secular perspective, does not leave them in a better position
than other children. 101
Although accommodation increases the religious freedom of
those accommodated, overbroad accommodation limits the freedom
of others in two ways. First, when accommodation is expensive,
taxpayers are forced to subsidize the religious observance of those
accommodated. Also, excessive accommodation prefers those
accommodated. This could occur if certain sects were given wholesale exemptions from drug use restrictions or other burdensome
laws. Thus, accommodation should be granted only when it imposes no substantial costs on others through government and does not
privilege those accommodated.
B.

Substantial Infringement of a Sincere Belief

Establishing a prima facie violation of free exercise requires
showing an infringement of a sincere religious belief or practice. 102 The infringement must be substantial; de minimis infringements do not suffice. 103 Weisman makes clear that arguments of

who attend religioUs schools. True neutrality would extend equal aid to children in both
secular and religious schools.
99. See Mozert v. Hawkin County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (rejecting request for accommodation).
100. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (stating that "the religious
exercise'' caused "embarrassment and . . . intrusion" and "[a]ssuming . . . that the prayers
were offensive to the student"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 624 (1986) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (indicating that the censorship of creation science may incorrectly teach
students that science has definitely falsified their religious beliefs).
101. A policy of no aid to any private school treats religious schools equally with nonsectarian private schools. From the perspective of religious freedom, however, this policy
is not neutral because public schools, which do receive government aid, are secular. Thus,
the no-aid policy discriminates against religion. See Valauri, supra note 93, at 103 (emphasizing that a no aid principle is not a neutral principle since it does not meet the
requirement of impartiality).
102. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dis!., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426 (N.Y. 1989) (stating
that in order for the claimant to receive an exemption, she "must show . a sincerely held
religious belief that is burdened by a State requirement").
103. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (stating that "whatever benefit
there is to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental");
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insubstantiality will face skepticism in the Supreme Court. 104 In
that case, the Supreme Court conceded that the commencement
prayer in issue was "a brief exercise" which the individual was
free to ignore. 105 Yet "the embarrassment and the intrusion" of
the prayer could not be dismissed as "de minimis." 106 The Court
stated that the school authorities' effort "to be civic or nonsectarian
rather than pertaining to one sect does not lessen the offense or
isolation to the objectors. At best it narrows their number, at worst
[it] increases their sense· of isolation and affront. " 107 One could
infer from this statement that rarely can a religious affront be
excused as de minimis.
The belief infringed must be religious. 108 Sometimes free exercise claims encounter the defense that the challenged practice is
inherently nonreligious. An objective standard of what is religiously
significant is inevitably discriminatory since every sect has its own
idea of what is religiously relevant. An objective standard discriminates against minority sects because the attitudes of their members
often appear odd or irrational to the majority. An objective standard also discriminates against traditional or fundamentalist sects
because, for members of these sects, religion is pervasive-everything in their lives is religiously significant. 109 Under
an objective standard, modernist sectarians and secularists, who
have a narrower concept of what is religious, could restrict the
religious freedom of others by classifying many activities as objec-

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) ('"distinguish[ing] between real threat and
mere shadow"' and characterizing legislative prayer as "no real threat") (quoting Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961) (indicating that laws prohibiting retail sales on Sundays imposed "only an indirect burden" on Orthodox Jewish businessmen).
104. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
105. /d. (noting that during the prayer "the individual can concentrate on joining its
message, meditate on her own religion, or let her mind wander").
106. Id. ("[W]e think that the intrusion is greater than the two minutes or so of time
consumed for prayers like these.").
107. /d.
108. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[T]o have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."); Ware v. Valley Stream
High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426 (N.Y. 1989) (burdened belief must be a "sincerely
held religious" one).
109. See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 997 (1989) (emphasizing that "[f]or many religious persons, religious and secular beliefs and values are not nicely compartmentalized[;]
religious beliefs and values may permeate a religious person's world view") and authorities cited therein.
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tively nonreligious.
For example, in a free exercise challenge to the teaching of
evolution, a federal judge failed to recognize this potentially adverse impact of an objective standard. 110 He proclaimed that "the
offending material is peripheral to the matter of religion"! 111
Consider, also, such issues as the consumption of pork, the covering of one's head, and the style of one's undergarments. To modernist sects and nonreligious persons, these issues have no religious
significance, but to Muslims, observant Jews and Mormons, they
are very significant. The determination of what is religiously important should be left to the individual claiming a free exercise
violation and not to some objective criterion dictated by the
state. 112
C.

Free Exercise Claims and Government Benefits

The argument that government need not adjust its benefits to
suit the religion of each citizen 113 often makes sense. For example, a citizen cannot require the government to remove a globe
from a post office or to provide an alternative post office just
because the globe offends the individual's religious belief that the
world is flat. The Court in Employment Division v. Smith seemed
to expand this principle by holding that government can withhold a
benefit (unemployment compensation) because of a person's crimi-

110. See Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (denying plaintiffs' request that "all theories regarding human origins" receive
"equal time"), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969
(1974).
Ill. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 121l (further stating that "(s]cience and religion necessarily deal with many of the same questions, and they may frequently provide conflicting
answers [, but t]eachers of science in the public schools should not be expected to avoid"
discussions of science that conflict with religion).
112. This issue is different from the question of what constitutes a religion for purposes
of the First Amendment. An objective standard must be used to detennine what is a religion under the Establishment Clause. Otherwise, a citizen could overturn any government
activity simply by declaring that she considers the attitude promoted by the activity "religious." This mode of attack was attempted in Smith v. Board of School Commissioners,
in which the plaintiffs alleged that public schools had established the religion of secular
humanism through the use of particular textbooks. The attempt failed because the court,
referring to the requirements of the three-factored test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971), denied that any doctrines being promoted by the public schools
through their textbooks amounted to the establishment of a religion of secular humanism.
Smith v. Board of Sch. Cornrn'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 688 (11th Cir. 1987).
113. See Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 427 (N.Y. 1989)
(st~ting that "parents have no constitutional right to tailor public school programs to individual preferences, including religious preferences").
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nal use of drugs in a religious ceremony. 114
Lee v. Weisman suggests a very different attitude. The prayer
in Weisman was defended on the ground that attendance at commencement was voluntary." 5 This argument emphasized, in effect, that attendance was a government benefit that objectors were
free to forego. 116 The Court dismissed this argument as
formalistic in the extreme . . . . Everyone knows that in
our society and in our culture high school graduation is
one of life's most significant occasions . . . . [I]t is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself fiOm the
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary," ... The Constitution forbids the State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending
her own high school graduation. 117
This statement at least lays to rest the argument that anyone
religiously offended by public education should simply attend a
private school. Education is not only crucial in modem life, but is
also legally obligatory. 118 The alternative of a religiously acceptable private school is cost prohibitive for many individuals and,
furthermore, is unavailable at any price for small sects who have
not established religious schools. For many individuals, then, public
education is not "in any real sense of the term 'voluntary. "' 119
Arguments to the contrary are "formalistic in the extreme." 120
However, the Court in Weisman also cautioned that not "every
state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens
find it offensive . . . . [O]ffense alone does not in every case show
a violation. We know too that sometimes to endure social isolation
or even anger may be the price of conscience or nonconformity."121 The Court's statement makes sense if the goal of free exercise claimants is to invalidate government acts that offend them.
This is because an invalidation or prohibition would deprive other

114.
supra
I15.
I16.
I17.
I18.
R. &
119.
120.
121.

494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). For a discussion of Employment Division v. Smith, see
notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
See id.
!d. at 2659-60.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Baldwin 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES
REGs. tit. 8, § 101.2 (1987).
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
!d.
!d. at 2661.
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citizens, who are not offended, of the benefits of those acts. In
general, though, free exercise claimants do not seek to invalidate
government action, but instead only seek some accommodation for
themselves. 122 Thus, the Court's warning of a limit to relief from
an offensive government action seems less appropriate when the
relief sought is not invalidation, but accommodation.
The Religion Clauses also raise more general questions about
the form of government benefits. Government generally provides
benefits in three ways. First, it furnishes some benefits as cash
benefits, like Aid to Families with Dependent Children 123 and agricultural price supports. 124 Second, it provides vouchers, as in
food stamps 125 and college tuition under the GI bill. 126 Third, it
provides some benefits in kind, through services, as in the case of
public schools and hospitals.
The choice among these forms in a particular case generally
depends on administrative convenience, effectiveness in achieving
policy objectives, and the dignity of the beneficiaries; the impact
on religious freedom is rarely considered at all. The choice, however, may determine the ££pstitutionality of the plan. For example,
welfare recipients are free to donate part of their benefits to a
church; indeed, it would be unconstitutional to forbid such donations with welfare grants. Yet if a state decided to cease cash
payments and to provide benefits in kind, some taxpayers would
undoubtedly complain if the state agreed to pay state funds directly
to a beneficiary's church, even if this method of direct payment by
the state produced the same result as a system of cash grants. The
beneficiary's freedom to make donations would be lost. In this
way, the growth of the welfare state can diminish religious freedom.127
This danger should alert us to interpret the Free Exercise
Clause broadly enough and the Establishment Clause narrowly
enough to preserve religious freedom. Consider, for example, a

122. See supra note 31 and acc9mpanying text (cases where individual accommodation
sought).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988) (aid program for families with dependent children).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1421 (1988) (agricultural price support program).
125. /d. §§ 2011-2030 (1988) (food stamp program).
126. 38 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988) (education assistance program for "service on active
duty").
127. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 486 (stating that the growth of the regulatory and welfare state exacerbated the problems created by the Supreme Court's adoption of separationism).
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patient who requests kosher meals in a public hospital. If this
accommodation be deemed an unconstitutional establishment of
religion, the patient must either forego hospitalization that may be
crucial to her survival or violate her religious beliefs. On the other
hand, if free exercise required that she be accommodated, she
would be freed from making this painful choice. The situation of
religious school children is often quite similar.
D.

Overriding Governmental Interest in Education

As noted earlier, Employment Division v. Smith raises doubt as
to whether infringements of free exercise can be justified only by a
compelling state interest. 128 If only a rational basis for government action were necessary, all free exercise claims would be
doomed. The special concern expressed in Employment Division v.
Smith about government actions affecting belief and about parental
control of children, 129 in addition to the greater sensitivity to religious freedom evinced in Lee v. Weisman, 130 raise hope that
more than a rational basis is necessary. Whether that standard is a
"compelling interest" test or some intermediate test is an important
question, but one that we cannot yet answer.
Another important question is whether the state has a strong
interest in requiririg anything more than the minimum education
necessary to avoid indigence. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme
Court found no compelling need to require Amish children to
attend high school at all. 131 The Court stressed that Amish children receive on-the-job vocational training and, thus, are unlikely
to become indigent wards of the state. 132 Yet Yoder, then, would
not excuse from school attendance children of a sect preaching
illiteracy or mendicancy. The state may have a compelling interest
in ensuring that some citizens obtain the higher education needed
to maintain a modern society. There is, however, no shortage of
volunteers for higher education. What then, should be required of
all citizens?
The state of New York recently claimed a compelling interest

128. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
129. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
130. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (stating "'that the government
may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct
means'").
131. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228-29 (1972).
132. /d. at 224-25.
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in subjecting children of the fundamentalist Plymouth Brethren sect
to school instruction about AIDS. 133 Even assuming that this instruction reduces the incidence of AIDS, which is doubtful, how
much would that effect be impaired by excusing the Plymouth
children? The state argued that some children might leave the sect
and pursue "alternative life-styles," and for lack of state instruction,
these individuals might contract and spread AIDS. 134 This argument is speculative. It is troubling that religious freedom could be
curtailed by mere speculation. Assume, however, that the state
could show a statistical probability that one or two cases of AIDS
would be prevented by subjecting the Plymouth children to AIDS
instruction. That evidence clinches the case for the state only if
religious freedom carries little or no weight as a constitutional
value. 135 If we take religious freedom seriously, though, we must
accept certain risks and costs as the price of that freedom. In this
case, preserving the integrity of the Plymouth Brethren justifies the
cost of foregoing the uncertain temporal benefit sought by the
state.
The argument against requiring most academic instruction is
even stronger. It simply is not necessary that one know theories of
evolution or learn reading from particular texts in order to avoid
poverty or to have a meaningful and rewarding life. What about
ethics and values? The Supreme Court sometimes suggests that the
state has a compelling interest in teaching children the values of
democracy and can further this interest through public education.136 The Court, however, also has severely limited, if not utterly rejected, these dicta by statements and holdings in other cases.
Thus, the Court has held that children may reject public schools
and attend private schools, 137 or even eschew formal schooling

133. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 429-30 (N.Y. 1989).
134. See id. at 423.
135. If certain religious sects devalue healthful exercise and diet, would the state be
warranted in teaching children of these sects that their lifestyle is unwise?
136. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (indicating that the purpose of public education is the inculcation of values necessary to self-governance); Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 876 (1982) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing the vital
importance of public schools in the preparation and socialization of future citizens);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (stating that "[t]he importance of public
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions").
137. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that states do not
have the power "to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
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beyond the eighth grade. 138 These results are consistent with the
Court's oft-stated view that government may not compel expression139 or mandate the imposition of certain values or opinions in
public schools. 140
The latter view against compelling expression and imposing
certain values is the better view. Every polity necessarily embraces
a."Id tries to promote certain principles. Since the state can reward
certain actions and punish others, it should also be permitted to
exhort citizens to take or not take such actions. Public schools
should be an acceptable means for this purpose. 141 Citizens

public teachers only"). The Court also asserted, however, that states may require that
"certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship . . . be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." !d. at 534.
138. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972).
139. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20 (1986)
(holding that a state regulatory commission could not require a private utility to include
advertising fliers, with which the utility disagreed, in its bills); Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 178 n.l (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (indicating that "Lite coerced publication
of particular views . . . violates the freedom of speech"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (indicating that a state may not compel public employees to
make contributions to unions for political purposes without infringing on the employees'
constitutional rights); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that a state
may not compel drivers to display the state motto on their license plates); Elrod v. Bums,
427 U.S. 347, 353, 373 (1976) (holding that the government practice of dismissing employees on a partisan basis is unconstitutional); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1974) (holding that a state statute that grants a political candidate a
right to equal space in a newspaper to reply to personal criticism, thus forcing the newspaper to publish the replies, violates the guarantees of a free press). See generally David
B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and
Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995 (1982) (discussing the Court's failure to articulate a
consistent approach to negative First Amendment cases, or cases of compelled instruction).
140. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972) ("There can be no assumption
that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong."'); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) ("The classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."') (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (holding that the state may not constitutionally compel students to salute the flag
and recite a pledge).
141. Some, including J. S. Mill, disagree with this proposition and would forbid public
schools altogether. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 148-49 (The Atlantic Monthly Press
1921) (1859) ("A general State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be
exactly like one another . . .. "). Even without public schools, however, the state promotes certain values if it subsidizes education at all. Even a voucher system that permits
individuals to choose their schools still promotes education as a value. One who accepts
public educational subsidies could reject public schools, then, only on a theory that public
schools are particularly coercive. The ability of public schools to inculcate values is limited, though. See infra text accompanying notes 147-54. Thus, such a theory seems hard to
maintain.
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should, however, be allowed to shun instruction that offends them.
In a liberal democracy, this right is not an exception to the state's
power to promote values but, rather, an expression of the values it
promotes. We value freedom of conscience and a right of parents
to guide the moral and religious education of their children. 142
The state observes these values when it excuses children from
indoctrination that offends their religion.
The problem of the government's imposing values is illustrated
and underscored by asking which values public schools should
inculcate. Nadine Strossen argues that "among the most important"
values that schools can teach are "(1) a tolerance for diversity of
religious, political and other beliefs and ideas, and (2) a belief that
every individual should have equal rights and opportunities, regardless of such factors beyond the individual's control as race, sex,
religion, or national origin." 143 These vague generalities appeal to
most Americans, but any effort to give them real content would be
controversial. For example, does an emphasis on equal rights mean
opposition to racial preferences? Does tolerance for religious and
political diversity mean not criticizing Pat Robertson and Jesse
Jackson?
Many people, including many born-again Christians, would be
offended by Strossen's statement that religion is "beyond the
individual's control." 144 Even when people agree upon on a value, they may disagree about its source. For example, is stealing
wrong because the Bible says that it is wrong, or because, as Richard Posner says, it circumvents the market? 145 More important,
how can public schools preach tolerance if they practice intolerance
toward religious minorities? What kind of tolerance do children
learn when students, like those in Mozert, who refuse instruction
hostile to their religion are punished rather than accommodated?'46

142. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14 ("[T]he values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high
place in our society.'').
143. Strossen, supra note 68, at 376-77 (discussing challenges to "secular hwnanism''
and "scientific creationism" in the curricula of public schools and proposing standards for
the resolution of these challenges).
144. !d.
145. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 208, 220-21 (4th ed. 1992)
(stating that stealing is inefficient and should be discouraged).
146. See Mozer! v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Some students in Mozert were suspended. /d.
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Another objection to ethical indoctrination in public schools is
that there exists little evidence that public schools can actually
instill moral values or that particular values are "necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system." 147 Critics long
charged that Catholic schools teach authoritarian, anti-democratic
values and loyalty to Church rather than to nation. 148 Today, few
would claim that parochial school graduates are less patriotic or
democratic than public school graduates. 149 Thus, whatever the
public schools did differently seems not to have been too important, and it is highly unlikely that accommodating religious children
who object to certain values education will weaken the national
commitment to democratic values.
Indeed, I doubt that those who trumpet the importance of
teaching democratic values take their own rhetoric very seriously.
If they did, they would also try to make acceptance of these values
a condition of receiving government benefits or exercising certain
rights, such as voting. In fact, there is no such effort. Advocates
may believe that teaching democratic values in public schools is
necessary and mild. 150 The evidence shows, however, that such

147. Ambach v. N01wick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). Accord Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (public school can properly forbid offensive language because
the use of such language is contrary to necessary values in a democratic society). For
critiques of this position, see Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on
Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REv. 197 passim (1983). "It is
doubtful that value inculcation in the schools reduces political violence, effectively prepares students for citizenship, or produces loyal and patriotic citizens." Id. at 288-89. See
also Fred M. Hechinger, Defining Values, N.Y. nMEs, Oct. 21, 1986, at C9 ("The track
record of teaching values through formal instruction is not encouraging.").
148. See Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendmellt Religion
Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 843-44 (1984) (stating that American courts and commentators of the 1940's viewed the Catholic Church and its schools as "primarily concerned
with indoctrinating the children to be obedient to the Church and its priests"); Laycock,
supra note 79, at 417-18 (explaining that as late as 1962 the Catholic Church was being
described .as a totalitarian system that threatened American freedoms). See also Jeremy
Rabkin, Disestablished Religion in America, 86 PUB. INTEREST 124, 133-34 (1987) (stating
that the belief that the Catholic hierarchy taught undemocratic values led to an opposition
to state funding for Catholic schools in the Nineteenth Century).
149. See ANDREW M. GREELEY & PETER H. ROSSI, THE EDUCATION OF CATHOLIC
AMERICANS 114-36 (1966) (asserting that parochial and public school graduates do not
differ in their political attitudes).
150. See Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public
Schools, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 773, 792 (1993). Ingber claims that "[s]chools cannot
avoid instilling values." Id. Ingber also minimizes the affront the teaching of such values
will have on religious children and their parents: exposure to "objectionable ideas" in public schools "is to be expected." Id. at 787. Religious children, Ingber argues, have no
greater claim to be free from exposure to objectionable beliefs than anyone else. !d.
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teaching is unnecessary, and the complaints of the religious indicate that, at least in their eyes, it is not mild. 151
Professor Ingber counters that if public schools cannot effectively inculcate democratic values, then they also cannot lure children from their faith, as religious parents fear. 152 This argument
misconstrues the critique of public school indoctrination of values.
One part of the critique is that democratic values may be instilled
in ways other than public school instruction, as evidenced by the
support of democracy among parochial school graduates. 153 A
second part is that widespread acceptance of these values may be
unnecessary to preserve democracy. 154 Neither of these criticisms
suggests that public schools can never inculcate values.
Further, even if schools cannot instill values, they may still
undermine values that children learn elsewhere. Children who are
confronted with conflicting instruction from school on one hand,
and from church and parents on the other, may react by rejecting
both. Faith is threatened even more when the school's opposition
to it is bolstered by values of the broader society. Even if public
schools cannot inculcate certain values, they may, by acting in concert with radio, television, movies, magazines, and the attitudes and
behavior of a child's peers, be able to erode religious belief.
Once again, this does not mean that public schools must not
teach values at all; education inevitably bolsters some values and
weakens others. Public schools can promote certain values over the
objection of a substantial minority or even a majority. When the
instruction clashes with religious belief, however, it violates the
free exercise rights of the objectors, who may be entitled to some
accommodation.
E.

Corrosive Secularism and Excessive Entanglement

The Supreme Court has often stated that prohibiting government aid to religion not only protects the freedom of citizens who
do not want their taxes so used, but also protects religious organizations against "corrosive secularism." 155 No doubt, government
151. See supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text. Religious parents can hardly be
blamed for vehemently objecting to some of the affronts to their beliefs espoused in our
public schools.
152. Ingber, supra note 150, at 784 n.55.
153. See GREELEY & ROSSI, supra note 149, at 125-27 (showing that Catholic school
graduates are no more intolerant of freedom of speech and religion than their public
school counterparts).
154. See van Gee), supra note 147, at 263.
155. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (stating that even a
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aid can have that effect. One should not be surprised, then, that
religion remains more vibrant in America than in many nations
with established churches. To avoid this corrosion, however, requires not a blanket condemnation of any aid that reaches a religious organization, but a more nuanced concern about the kind of
aid and its likely effects.
For example, state funding for ecclesiastical salaries may influence who is chosen to be a cleric. Even if the state plays no apparent role in the choice, fear of reduction or elimination of funding may influence a sect's choice of clergy and also intimidate
incumbent clerics. Many existing aid programs do not seem to
have corroded religion/ 56 however, and it is unlikely that many
proposed programs would do so, either. As government increased
aid to higher education after World War II, some colleges became
less distinctively sectarian. 157 Government aid, however, probably
did not. cause these changes. Although some religious colleges
became less sectarian, so did many parochial schools that receive
no government aid. The changes seem to result from forces far
broader than government aid programs. Moreover, government aid
to college students helped to spawn colleges that are more deeply
religious. Thus, government aid to higher education has neither
promoted nor corroded religion. It simply increased religious freedom by giving students choices they would not have had if aid
were limited to public or nondenominational colleges. Similarly,
enacting voucher programs for primary and secondary school children more than likely would not promote or corrode either religion
in general, or the religious mission of parochial schools.
Opposition to government aid because of its corrosive secularism is never made by the recipient sect; if the sect perceives such
a threat, it simply rejects the aid. 158 Thus, opposition always cogovernmentally favored religion may be "compromised as political figures reshape the
religion's beliefs for their own purposes"); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
385 (1985) (stating that state sponsored religious indoctrination, if allowed to occur, would
"taint" the religious beliefs with a "corrosive secularism").
156. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld certain aid programs and thus did not find
that they corroded religion. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986) (upholding a state provision of aid to students attending
religious schools); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976) (upholding
direct state subsidies to colleges affiliated with the Catholic Church); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (permitting a state to pay for the bus transportation of
parochial school students).
157. At many sectarian colleges, mandatory religious instruction and chapel attendance
have ended and enrollment of students of other faiths has increased.
158. In theory, objection could be filed by dissident members of a sect. In practice, this
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mes from non-members of the recipient sect, often from groups
and judges who seem hostile to traditional religions or religion
generally. This gives reason to doubt the sincerity of the
opposition's concern about corrosive secularism.
A related issue is the excessive entanglement between church
and state that may occur when government monitors a religious
organization's compliance with the constitutional requirements of an
aid program. The Supreme Court has struck down some aid programs because they provided no monitoring to prevent the use of
government money to promote religion. 159 Where monitoring is
provided, however, the Court bans the program for creating excessive entanglement between church and state. 160 Moreover, where
a program lacks monitoring, the Court sometimes declares that, if
monitoring were introduced, it would create excessive entanglement. 161 Critics on and off the Court have called this a Catch-22
argument: "the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does
not further religion renders the statute invalid." 162
The concept of excessive entanglement between church and
state is not helpful. The goal of the religion clauses is to enhance
religious freedom without promoting or hindering religion. So long
as government activity does not promote religion (or favor one sect
over another), the concerns of society generally are satisfied; concerns about hindering religion should be raised by the church or its
members. 163 The concept of excessive entanglement obscures
rather than illuminates the proper analysis of these issues.

almost never happens.
159. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 386 (1985) (without
proper monitoring, a state program where private school teachers were paid with public
funds to teach after-school classes to private school students creates "too great a risk of
state-sponsored indoctrination""); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (to ensure
publicly supported "auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral'" while teaching in nonpublic schools, state would have to engage in "continued surveillance"" of these teachers).
160. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985) (requiring city agents to visit and
inspect a religious school for evidence of religious matter in Title I classes constituted
excessive government entanglement with religion).
161. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (stating that state surveillance of state subsidized religious school teachers "will involve excessive and enduring
entanglement between state and church.. ).
162. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988).
163. See Douglas L~ycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv.
1373, 1383 (1981).
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Student, Parental and Group Rights

Professor Ingber and others have objected that free exercise
claims against public schools reflect the faith of the parents but not
necessarily the faith of the children. 164 The usual retort is that
our law recognizes "the right of parents . . . to direct the education
of their children." 165 Although this answer is sufficient, the objection invites a deeper answer. Both the objection and the reply treat
free exercise claims as raising only issues of individual rights; the
two views differ only about whether to prefer the rights of the
parent or the child. However, religious freedom also entails a right
of religious communities not to be overwhelmed by the power of
the state. The Court in Yoder recognized this by stressing the survival of the Amish community and not just the individual rights of
the claimants. Legal scholarship has paid more attention recently to
group rights and the idea of community. Akhil Amar has shown
that this interest is not new, but revives a tradition even older than
the tradition of individual rights. 166
The communitarian tradition is especially relevant to the religion clauses because ''the survival of religious communities is necessary to make the religious freedom of individuals "both possible
and meaningful." 167 The education of children is crucial to this
survival. People are mortal, but humanity (we hope) is not. To survive, religious groups depend on raising their members' children
within the faith. Although government may not act affirmatively to
preserve any particular religious group or religion generally, religious freedom permits, and to some extent requires, government to
forbear from unnecessarily weakening religious communities. When
public schools undermine a sect without a compelling need to do
so, the state should offer reasonable accommodation to children of
the sect.
This problem of religion and education is well illustrated by

164. See Ingber, supra note 150, at notes 70, 71 and accompanying text.
165. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
166. Akhil R. Amar, Note, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132-33 (1991) (suggesting that the drafters of the Bill of Rights intended to protect
groups, majority as well as minority, from government).
167. Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1984) (asserting that the Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause complement each other in protecting religious choice).
See also Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 544 ("[I]ndividual free exercise cannot be
treated in isolation from the need for religious associations.").
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the quandary of the Zobrest family, the plaintiffs in a case now
before the Supreme Court. 168 Jim Zobrest, who is deaf, was attending a public school which, by federal law, had to provide him
with a sign-language interpreter. His mother took Jim to Mass and
in her own words:
I tried signing what they were saying, but I spent most of
my time answering questions like, "How long before we
can go home?'' and "why do we have to come here?''
I thought the only way he would learn the basics of
Christianity was to be at a [Catholic School], where it's
part of the atmosphere. 169
At least in some cases, children may need more than a formal,
doctrinal exposure to religion; to appreciate their religion, they may
need to live it. The monadic view of rights taken by some civil
libertarians ignores this need, but anyone who values religious
freedom cannot ignore it.
V.

A.

REMEDIES

Accommodation of Religion

Two scholars connected with this symposium have stated antipodal views on the question of how much government may or must
accommodate religion. Professor Marshall argues that courts should
almost never require accommodation, but that the political branches
of government may grant discretionary (or permissive)
accommodation. 170 Professor Lupu, by contrast, opposes discretionary accommodation by the political branches, but construes the
Free Exercise Clause to require accommodation in some cases. 171
Although Professor Marshall is correct in saying that judges in
accommodation cases are likely to favor sects that are large and
familiar, 172 that problem is likely to be much greater with discre-

168. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
169. Tamar Lewin, A Test of Church-State Relations in a Deaf Student's Need, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1993, at AIO.
170. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 324 (1991).
171. Lupu, supra note 37, at 743; Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishmeflt
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
555, 582-87 (1991) (suggesting that legislative acconunodation will result in prejudice and
inequality).
172. Marshall, supra note 170, at 311.
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tionary accommodation by the political branches. Given Professor
Marshall's position, how should courts respond to unequal accommodation of different sects? If they demand equal accommodation
for disfavored sects, not much remains of Professor Marshall's
position, because nearly every claim for accommodation can be
framed as seeking what another sect already has. 173 Alternatively,
courts could do nothing. In his majority opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia recognized and accepted that
"leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in. " 174 This is precisely what the government should not
do - the purpose of the Religion Clauses is to demand government neutrality toward religion. Favoritism in accommodation by
the political branches would also undoubtedly generate pressure on
the courts to declare various accommodations violative of the Establishment Clause, thus narrowing the scope of accommodation.
Many legislative accommodations are adopted out of concern
that they are constitutionally required, either standing alone or
because similar accommodations have been granted to other
sects. 175 Eliminating judicial accommodations would remove this
concern and therefore decrease legislative accommodation and
reduce religious freedom.
Professor Lupu's position is harder to weigh because he would
allow some discretionary accommodation, but how much is unclear.176 The disposition of a free exercise claim depends on at
least three factors: whether there is a burden on free exercise; 177
whether granting relief would violate the Establishment Clause by
promoting religion; 178 and whether granting relief would interfere
173. For example, fundamentalist children could argue that they do not object to having
public school texts inimical to their beliefs so long as other children have texts inimical
to their beliefs; they seek texts consistent with their beliefs only because other children
have already been granted that accommodation.
174. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
175. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 532 (asserting that pre-Smith decisions
indicated that accommodation was required unless government interests were unduly burdened).
176. Lupu refers to leaving "little room." Lupu, supra note 37, at 772. Lupu "would
assign strong, judicially enforceable content to both the Free Exercise Clause as a platform for mandatory accommodations and the Establishment Clause as a barrier to permissive accommodations, and leave little room between them for the exercise of political
discretion." /d.
177. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (if state action does not
deny free exercise, no accommodation is required).
178. As determined by applying the three part test found in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
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with significant governmental objectives. 179 Especially concerning
the last factor, the government should be able to decide ab initio
that accommodation would not unduly hinder significant objectives,
and courts should not lightly overturn this decision.
Discretionary accommodation is desirable because it avoids
litigation. Constitutional litigation is particularly divisive because it
involves issues of principle. This divisiveness can sometimes be
mitigated or avoided by legislative or administrative action. Since
avoidance of strife is arguably one function of the Religion Clauses, 180 this mitigation is beneficial. The cost of litigation also
means that many free exercise (and other constitutional) claims are
never pressed if litigation is necessary to vindicate them. Discretionary accommodation is desirable to make sure that these claims
do not go unsatisfied.
To illustrate these last two points, consider the request of a
school child for religious accommodation. If only courts can grant
accommodation, expense will probably prevent the claim from ever
being made. If the claim is made it will be divisive because it will
pit the child and parents against school officials who might otherwise have worked things out amicably. Under Professor Lupu's
approach, when political branches are unable to grant
accommodations without court involvement, the litigation necessary
to authorize the accommodation will often degenerate into a charade. If government officials support an accommodation, a court
has no controversy to decide. If the officials merely pretend to

u.s.

602, 612-13 (1971).
179. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (in order for a state to deny a free exercise
claim, there must be "a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.").
180. The Supreme Court has sometimes forbidden aid to religious schools on the ground
that such aid is politically divisive. In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973), the Court suggested that: '"What is at stake as a matter of policy [in Establishment Clause cases] is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a
political system to the breaking point."' Jd. at 796 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., in a separate opinion)).
See id. at 795-97 (finding that a New York law providing maintenance grants, tuition reimbursement grants and income tax relief to nonpublic schools creates the potential
for political divisiveness); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15 (1975) (suggesting
that a Pennsylvania act allowing for the loan of materials and equipment to nonpublic
schools could have politically divisive effects); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24
(1971) (asserting that the political divisiveness caused by granting aid to parochial schools
would shift the focus of the community away from more important issues). See also
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962) (holding that prayer recommended by the
state to be recited every morning in school violates the Establishment Clause).
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oppose the accommodation in order to facilitate the necessary litigation, they are unlikely to litigate with much zeal. This ineffectual
opposition will have regrettable effects on adjudication in an adversarial judicial system. Professor Lupu's position also raises
difficult questions about what is an accommodation. For example,
is a rule that certain government employees cannot be compelled to
work on Sundays an accommodation or a neutral general rule?
Problems with PiOfessor Lupu's position may be better understood by applying the same argument to other constitutional rights.
For example, should the state deny all due process rights of notice
and hearing or reject all free speech claims unless order~d by a
court? I think those who care about constitutional rights would say
not. Limiting these rights to what is mandated by the courts would
cause uncertainty, impose unnecessary expense, provoke needless
disputes, and spawn spurious litigation. The same is true in the
free exercise area. 181
Accommodation is neutral when it frees its beneficiaries from a
burden to which others are not subject or confers a benefit that
others already enjoy. Accommodation, however, is not neutral
when it prefers its beneficiaries over others from a temporal or
secular perspective. A religious objector to public schooling could
not, for example, demand a private tutor. 182 That kind of accommodation would reduce religious freedom by preferring some religionists over other citizens and by forcing some to subsidize the
religion of others.

181. A possible argwnent for Professor Lupu's position is that accommodation of free
exercise claims could violate the Establishment Clause. However, the danger of such violations is small enough that government officials should be able to decide in the first instance how to reconcile the two clauses. Courts can hear challenges in the rare cases
where objections arise.
182. Exemptions from some general legal obligations are unappealing to most non-members of the exempted sect and, therefore, do not favor the exempted sect from a secular
viewpoint. Accommodation by exemption is intended to relieve religionists of a special
burden they would suffer from compliance with a law. Because of this special burden, the
withholding of exemptions cannot be treated as a neutral baseline. If the temporal advantages of an exemption are slight, the benefit to the religious freedom of the exempted
sect may outweigh the disadvantages to non-members of being denied the exemption.
Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (state may not exempt
religious literature sold by religious organizations from sales tax) and Estate of Thornton
v. Calder, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (state may not require employers to excuse
employees from work on their Sabbath) with Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (government may exempt religious organizations from ban on religious discrimination in employment).
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Exemptions from Instruction and Substitute Instruction

Exemption from religiously offensive instruction should be
granted unless government has a compelling reason for requiring
all· children to receive the instruction. 183 Such grounds exist only
if the exemption would leave a child without some basic knowledge or skill. 184 By this standard, most requests for exemption
should be granted.
Must government offer religious objectors substitute instruction?
A positive answer could be based on the principle that, even when
government has a compelling reason for acting, it must pursue its
end through the means least restrictive of constitutional rights. 185
In Rust, however, the Supreme Court held that "Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks
to deal with the problem in another way." 186 In so doing, though,
it cannot establish religion or impair its free exercise. For example,
a state university cannot furnish space for use by secular groups
while denying space for religious groups. 187 Similarly, a state that
grants benefits to the involuntarily unemployed cannot withhold
them from persons unemployed because of religious convictions.188

183. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the state had no compelling reason to require Amish children to attend high school since such children received sufficient vocational training at home).
184. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
185. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,
363 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960). See also NOWAK, supra note 32 at 1069 ("[I]f the state could achieve
its goal as well by a means which would not burden the religious practice, it will be required to adopt the alternative means.").
186. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991).
187. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
188. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. !36, 146 (1987) (state's
refusal to pay unemployment benefits to worker fired for refusal to work on Sabbath, in
accordance with religious beliefs, violates the Free Exercise Clause); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (state's denial of unemployment compensation to Jehovah's
Witness who quit defense-related employment due to religious beliefs violated Free Exercise Clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (state may not use eligibility
requirements of unemployment compensation law "so as to constrain a worker to abandon
his religious convictions respecting the [Sabbath]"). See also Dent, supra note 3, at 881
n.98 (discussing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which a majority of the Supreme Court opined that the government could not condition receipt of Social Security
benefits on the recipient's providing a Social Security number if so doing violated the
recipient's religious beliefs). But cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
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Rust also says that '"[a] legislature's decision not to subsidize
the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right. "' 189 Thus, parents who reject all theories of evolution cannot demand instruction in a different theory, such as creationism.
However, claims for substitute instruction rarely seek an objective
different from the school's. Children who request substitute readers,
for example, accept the government's secular objective to teach
reading and ask only that it be done without disparaging their
religion. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Rust tried to compel the government to subsidize new and additional messages. 190 That is a
different and much broader claim.
There are constitutional limits on alternative instruction, though.
The principle of religious neutrality forbids schools to give religious objectors a substitute that is, from a secular perspective, superior to what other children get. Admittedly, this obligation poses
hard line-drawing problems. For example, if a child objects to a
reading program, the school can furnish an alternative reader, but
how much time should the teacher spend with that child? If the
answer is, no more than with each other child, the objector suffers
from having neither group instruction nor special individual attention. That consequence seems inevitable, however, because the alternative of providing special individual instruction would improperly prefer that child over others.
Some argue that the state has a compelling interest in avoiding
the administrative burden of giving exemptions and alternative
instruction. 191 The Supreme Court has never held that this interest
overrides a free exercise claim. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court
said that to be compelling, an administrative burden must be so
great as to render an "entire statutory scheme unworkable." 192
This view mirrors the attitude behind much recent legislation re-

(state may withhold unemployment benefits from those unemployed because of criminal
use of drugs during religious ceremony) (discussed supra at notes 35-54 and accompanying text).
189. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461
u.s. 540, 549 (1983)).
190. Id. (rejecting claim that Federal Government's refusal to permit abortion counseling
in Title X funded clinics violates the First Amendment).
191. Thus Professor Ingber fears that accommodation will leave "public education in
shreds." Ingber, supra note 150, at 791 (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
192. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). See generally Dent, supra note 3, at
903-05.
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quiring both public and private institutions to accommodate citizens
with special needs, such as the disabled and non-English speaking
students. 193 Administrative costs confer no benefit on those accommodated that might influence a citizen's religious choices. Nor
do they create an appearance of government endorsement. A more
difficult question is whether the cost of compliance can negate an
otherwise valid free exercise claim to accommodation. A negative
answer could ·be premised on Supreme Court decisions that cost
and convenience cannot justify burdens on constitutional rights. 194
Discussion at gatherings like this symposium tends to be technical and lawyerly, but I hope that the accommodation of religious
children will not tum into an exercise in hypertechnical line-drawing. It is not in anyone's interest to litigate every detail of accommodation, or to monitor with a stopwatch the time a teacher
spends on each child. If everyone acts in good faith and with
tolerance, problems should be manageable. Recall that in Mozert
the religious children were accommodated without incident for
some time, until the school board stepped in and forbade any accommodation.195 That attitude is unnecessarily cruel, divisive and
insensitive to religious freedom.
C.

Group Prayer and Moments of Silence

Requests for accommodations generally seek exemptions or
substitute instruction, 196 but they could seek other relief, including
accommodation for prayer. Thirty-one years ago the Supreme Court
correctly held mandatory school prayer unconstitutional. 197 No official school-sanctioned prayer can be neutral. No matter how it is

193. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327. In passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress under::tood that requiring
private and public institutions to accommodate the disabled would be costly. Senator
Hatch, while supporting the bill, noted "this bill will prove very expensive to implement."
136 CONG. REc. S9685 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Nevertheless,
Senator Hatch was willing to incur this burden in order to bring the disabled into the
economic mainstream. !d. Similarly, the Court is willing to sacrifice higher administrative
costs in order to safeguard constitutional protections.
194. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (administrative ease and convenience
insufficient to justify gender based classifications); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149
(1972) (cost insufficient to support state practice of charging fees for entry into primary
election); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1969) ("The saving of welfare
costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.").
195. See Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1100), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
196. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
197. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
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worded, any prayer will offend atheists, and some religious sects
will inevitably object to the content of any prayer or to the very
idea of state recitation of a prayer. Moments of silence may be
different. Since the moment can be used for any kind of prayer,
meditation or contemplation, or simply for relaxation, a moment of
silence does not seem to promote religion in general or any religion in particular. Thus a moment of silence should rankle only
those who believe that children should make noise all the time.
It is argued, however, that in practice moments of silence pose
the same problems as an official prayer. 198 If the teacher and
several students pull out rosary beads or yarmulkes, other students
will feel pressure to pray or pretend to pray, and in either case
will feel alienated. One answer to this fear is that it is farfetched-it is highly unlikely that enough students will engage in
sectarian behavior so as to pressure others to pray. A second answer is that this parade of horrors is not so horrid-if several
students do engage in distinctively sectarian behavior, the class
may learn greater appreciation of religious pluralism. That some
students may feel discomfort because others use the moment to
pray is insufficient reason to forbid moments of silence. 199
Moreover, excluding moments of silence is hardly neutral.
School occupies children for about half of the waking day on half
the days of the year. To preclude even a moment of silence during
the school day sends the non-neutral message that prayer is at best
something to keep hidden. This attitude supports the privatization
thesis-that religion is acceptable only if it is kept out of sight, out
of the public square. 200 It indicates that prayer should be kept

198. See David Z. Seide, Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 406 (1983) (stating that moments of silence are
"no different for analytical purposes than sectarian, nondenominational, or voluntary
prayers"').
199. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
("[T]o justify prohibition of a particular expression or opinion, [the state] must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."').
200. See RicHARD J, NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBUC SQUARE: REUGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA passim (reprinted 1991); Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy - A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275, 277 (1986)
(asserting that decisions since Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), are "judicial
attempts to move religion into the realm of subjective preference by eliminating religious
consciousness"'); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion,
41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 22 (1991) (discussing the privatization thesis in the context of
the Establishment Clause and substantive due process). Professor Myers suggests that
privatization of religion is a theme "common in our legal discourse."' Id. at 21.
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even more private than urination and defecation, for which schools
at least designate private spaces. It also suggests, contrary to the
beliefs of most religious people, that religion can and should be
kept separate, isolated from the rest of human existence.
Designating a moment when prayer is allowed may be not only
permitted but mandated by the Constitution. Suppose that some
students want a moment to pray together. To minimize disruption
they ask the school to pick the moment. Could their request be
denied? No one argues that a child in public school can be forbidden to pray alone, silently. As a corollary, if a child informs a
teacher that she says a brief silent prayer at a particular time each
day, the teacher could not interrupt the prayer. As the Supreme
Court has said: "In our system, students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved." 201
The situation is no different if several students want to pray
silently together. To permit individual prayer but not group prayer
would deny "the associational aspects of free exercise. " 202 A
group prayer need not be so disruptive that denial would be justified as a compelling state interest. At the least, opponents of moments of silence should have to show clearly that group prayer had
been tried and had proved disruptive; important constitutional rights
should not be denied on the basis of unconfirmed fears. 203 In
other words, the burden should be on the state to prove a compelling state interest, not on citizens to disprove it. The state need not
pennit a moment of silence if nobody requests one. However, the
state could and perhaps should designate such a moment voluntarily.204 Otherwise, the burden is placed on religious students to

201. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (striking down a school rule forbidding the wearing of
black armbands to show opposition to the Vietnam War). However, conduct which "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." !d. at
513.
202. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 92, at 495-96 (asserting that the Court has ignored
the Free Exercise Clause as it applies to groups):
203. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at SOB (unsubstantiated fear of disruption did not justify
school rule against wearing of armbands to protest war in Vietnam).
204. The situation is different from that in Lee v. Weisman where the Court found that
expecting students and parents to remain silent during an official prayer constituted a form
of compulsion. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992). The Court found that because the
silence was expected during a particular prayer, the silence constituted a degree of endorsement of the religious views reflected in the prayer. /d. By contrast, remaining silent

748

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:707

take the awkward step of requesting accommodation.
Of course, moments of silence could be abused. For example, a
teacher could encourage students during the moment of silence to
pray to Jesus to end abortion. Public schools can discourage abuses
by training and by punishing infractions. Courts can intervene if a
school fails to curb abuses. Improper promotion of, or opposition
to, religion is possible in virtually any classroom situation. A lesson on slavery or a discussion of ethics could permit a teacher to
praise or to criticize a particular faith or even religion in general.
The Supreme Court has sometimes ignored this fact and selectively
used the mere risk of promotion of religion to forbid public school
contacts with religion. 205 An approach that resolves all uncertainty
against any contact with religion is not neutral toward religion but
denigrates and stigmatizes it. That is not an appropriate attitude for
a government committed to religious freedom.
The foregoing discussion also helps to resolve the closely related question of "symbolic links." It is often argued that moments of
silence or equal access for religious extracurricular activities create
or might create a perception that public schools endorse religion.206 This alleged problem is also far-fetched and in any case

during a moment of silence does not endorse any particular religion or religion generally;
it merely endorses the freedom of students to pray, meditate, or relax in silence.
205. For example, the mere possibility that a teacher might improperly advance religion
has been held sufficient to invalidate programs where public school teachers provided
special education classes to parochial students, even though long experience with the programs disclosed not a single incident of proselytizing. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1985). The Court reasoned that if inappropriate behavior did occur
in a parochial school it would probably not be reported. Id. Yet, when officials monitored
a similar program to determine whether such behavior had occurred, the Court held that
such monitoring created excessive entanglement with religion. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 413 (1985). In contrast to the Grand Rapids reasoning, the Court in Bowen v. Kendrick held that the mere possibility that grants under the Adolescent Family Life Act might
be used improperly by recipients to promote religion did not render the statute unconstitutional. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 611-12 (1987). The Court stated that evidence
that grants had been so used in some instances would warrant cancelling grants to those
recipients but would not justify invalidating the entire program. Id. at 611.
206. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (petitioners argued that
granting after-school religious groups equal access to school resources would lead an
objective observer to believe that the school supported such religious meetings); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985) (moment of silence in public schools may indirectly coerce "religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion") (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)); Robett C. Boisvert, Jr., Of
Equal Access and Trojan Horses, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 373, 389 (1985) ("permitting religious groups to use public school facilities conveys a message of governmental endorsement of religion"); Ruti Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High
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correctable. Students are unlikely to perceive these activities as
endorsing religion, and public schools can help make sure of that
by stressing their neutrality toward every faith and toward religion
in general. Even under an equal access approach, public schools do
not subsidize religious extracurricular activities as they do secular
activities, such as sports and music, with expensive equipment,
instruction and facilities. Thus, that equal access creates a perception of governmental hostility to religion is at least a plausible
proposition. Here again, though, the fear is far-fetched and can be
negated by disclaimers.
D.

Voucher Plans

Under the school choice (or voucher) programs, advocated by
many, the state would pay a fixed amount of tuition for each
school child to attend the school of the· parents' choice, whether
public, private nonsectarian, or parochial. Opponents call such
programs unconstitutional because public money would be used,
directly or indirectly, to promote religion. 207 Do choice programs
favor religion, or merely treat it equally? The key questions here
are context and characterization: that is, what is it that religion is
like and with what must it be treated equally?
To separationists, the public school is no different from the
post office: religion has no place in either one; if you want religion, go elsewhere. This analysis breaks down if we recognize that
the two facilities are different and that the public school represents
a somewhat arbitrary form of subsidy.
Education is more important than postal service, so that reli-

Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 529, 566-71 (1985) f'A strong preswnption of . . . government endorsement
arises when [religious) clubs are organized in public high schools."); Leah G.
Morgenstein, Note, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens:
Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 239 (1991) ("When religious student groups meet on school premises in a school-sponsored activity forwn, students may not be able to discern government neutrality towards religion."); Seide, supra
note 199, at 401-03 (arguing that moments of silence in public schools are generally perceived as religiously oriented).
207. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that "a state subsidy of sectarian schools is invalid regardless of the form it takes [because all forms of assistance] give aid to the school's educational mission, which at heart
is religious"). These critics of school choice are correct in saying that, if there is a problem with the direct or indirect support of religion, segregation of public funds does not
solve this problem. Even if public money is used strictly for nonsectarian purposes, it still
frees up private money for religious purposes and thus facilitates the parochial school's
promotion of religion. See id.
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gious unacceptability in public schools is more onerous than religious unacceptability in post offices. Also, primary and secondary
public schooling has traditionally been an in kind benefit. Educational benefits do not have to take that form, however. Federal
subsidies for higher education are in the form of either vouchers or
cash-like grants. 208 When subsidies take this form, they can be
used at religious institutions, even "pervasively sectarian" institutions, without constitutional objection. 209 Prohibiting vouchers for
primary and secondary schools is neutral only in the twisted sense
that it maintains the status quo. 210
It does not necessarily follow that educational vouchers are
constitutionally required or even an advisable policy. We should
recognize, however, that using public schools as the only form of
education subsidy imposes a heavy burden on the religious freedom
of many Americans. This burden arises because the subsidy is
provided in kind rather than in another form that would permit
citizens greater choice. We should be sensitive to and willing to
alleviate this problem if we reasonably can.
Concededly, some money from vouchers might be used for
purely religious activities. Such use would not necessarily be unconstitutional. Public schools fund many extracurricular activities
that have little or no educational value. If one school spends public
money on extracurricular activities such as music and sports, while
a parochial school spends the same money on religious activities,
the state is properly neutral in funding the two schools equally. If
expenditures per pupil are the same, no one is subsidizing
another's religion; the state is merely funding extracurricular activities, some of which are secular and some of which are religious.
Put another way, voucher plans of this kind are neutral in that they
would not influence citizens to choose religious schools if they
were not already inclined to do so. 211

208. The Supreme Court has upheld several programs of grants that included religious
colleges and their students. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Pub. Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit a
state from giving tuition aid to a student preparing for the priesthood at a sectarian college); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 737 (1976) (state grants to religiously affiliated colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973) (state revenue
bonds); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (federal construction grants).
209. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 485-89.
210. See Sunstein, supra note 93, at 52 (denying that neutrality is truly neutral when
the status quo is unjust).
211. Non-members might choose sectarian schools for nonreligious reasons, such as
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Separationists may argue, however, that religion is different
from , these other activities. The Religion Clauses make clear that
the founders did consider religion different from other activities: it
is, after all, the only activity that the government cannot establish
and the free exercise of which the government cannot prohibit. It
does not follow, though, that the founders intended religious activity to be treated less favorably than music and sports. So long as
the total funding for parochial and nonsectarian schools are equal,
religion is not favored, the state is neutral, and religious freedom is
not violated.
This does not mean that states must fund parochial and nonsectarian schools equally. A state could, for example, decide to subsidize the study of science. Although a parochial school might decide for religious reasons to reject that subsidy, it cannot then
demand a subsidy for religious activities as an alternative. The
state's decision to subsidize the study of science is different from a
decision to subsidize glee clubs but not religious choirs because
there are obvious temporal reasons for the former but not for the
latter.

better secular education, but that choice creates no constitutional problem. Professor
Beschle, purporting to apply a neutrality standard, opposes "full funding of religious education" in order "[t]o guard against the possibility that a community might be deprived of
a quality nonreligious education option." Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal:
The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 151, 185 (1987). I have a hard time seeing this as a neutral position.
This position is no more neutral than one that opposes full funding of secular education
in order to guard against the possibility that a community might be deprived of a quality
religious educational option. See Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Ala. Crirn.
App. 1982) (upholding criminal conviction of Catholic parents who kept their child out of
school because no Catholic school was available). The former position is no more persuasive than the latter unless one prefers secular education, which of course is not neutral.
Professor Choper would permit aid to religious schools "to the extent that it does
not exceed the value of [the schools'] secular services." Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REv. 260, 340 (1968). This limitation is reasonable if secular services are defined narrowly. A religiously neutral government could decide to subsidize instruction in math, computers and American history without swaying citizens' choices between religious and nonreligious schools. But Choper's
limitation should not be constitutionally mandated. A religiously neutral government could
decide to subsidize extracurricular activities and leave it to each school to decide whether
those activities should be secular or religious. Again, such a program would not pressure
citizens to choose a religious school. Indeed, the limitation should be unconstitutional if
not narrowly defined. For example, one would have difficulty seeing why a religiously
neutral government would fund a glee club but not a religious choir, or subsidize sports
but not Bible studies. Such a program could influence citizens' religious choices by forcing them to choose between a school with state subsidized, secular extracurricular activities (such as sports) and a school with no subsidized extracurricular activities.
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The discussion of choice plans raises the question of whether it
is important or even desirable to encourage children to attend public schools by making these schools free while private schools
receive virtually no state subsidies. By favoring secular public
schools we disfavor schools that would teach children a richer,
deeper body of values. This should bother even those who generally applaud the liberal program for public schools. A common criticism from many points of the ideological spectrum is that contemporary American life is bland, shallow, materialistic, self-indulgent.
Many Americans have become Nietzsche's "last man"-people with
no commitment to anything deeper than their own creature comforts.212 Perhaps that situation is not so bad. Maybe the atrocities
perpetrated in this century by Marxist and National socialisms, by
religious fundamentalism and by ethnic hatred, make petty selfgratification appealing by comparison. Most of us, though, would
like to aspire to something better. Perhaps choice plans can help
cultivate deeper values, whether religiously or secularly based.
One cannot say how much public schools have contributed to
the current poverty of values. Television and radio, urbanization,
the car and economic prosperity have also been contributing factors. It is plausible, though, that public schools have played an
important role. If the public school program of teaching democratic
values, and nothing more, is unsatisfactory not only to certain sects
on religious grounds, but also to many ethnic and other groups on
secular grounds, we should consider offering an alternative.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Our nation is committed to giving every child a free education.
This is one of the most valuable benefits our government provides.
Traditionally, the form of this benefit has been the free public
school. But public schools often denigrate religion, especially traditional religions, in ways that inflict pain on many religious people.
If our constitutional commitment to religious freedom is serious,
we should try to accommodate these people in order to ease the
agonizing choice between education and faith.

212. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 12-14 (Thomas Common
trans. 1964). The last men "have their little pleasures" and all "wanteth the same; every
one is equal." ld. at 13. They lack any nobility of soul and any noble aspirations.

